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Abstract
Data fusion centers have been around since the
9/11 terrorist attacks but have been shackled with an
underperforming label. Products from fusion centers
often do not support the mission of the organizations
supporting the centers. This paper addresses the
questions of what are the historical barriers to
information sharing, and how can fusion centers
become more efficient and effective in this role? The
research and experience of the authors are viewed
through a Knowledge Management lens to propose
using Structured Analytic Technique exercises coupled
with applying knowledge management tools and
concepts to improve knowledge flow and the relevance
and quality of the intelligence products produced.

1. Introduction
State and local fusion centers were initially created
in the wake of the 9/11 Commission Report to help
“connect the dots” of seemingly disparate threat
indicators and, through information sharing, aid the
federal counterterrorism mission at the grassroots level.
Today this system consists of 79 centers: Forty-two
states and territories each have single primary centers,
while a dozen states (notably Texas and California) have
additional “recognized” centers to cover key regions [1].
While fusion centers have assisted in identifying leads
for what would become counterterrorism investigations,
their day-to-day utility is increasingly an all-crimes, allhazards mission [2]. Fusion centers are made up of
personnel from multiple law enforcement organizations
at the state and local level and federal agencies, and may
include civilian analysts as well.
The value of fusion centers is far more than the sum
of their parts, and recognizing the many noncounterterrorism functions they fulfill is important in
demonstrating this. This is not always easy to validate,
and fusion centers have come under significant criticism
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and scrutiny since their inception. The criticism that
fusion centers receive stems from the poorly defined and
loosely understood method in which they are evaluated.
Assessments’ of fusion centers are based on metrics
having to do with percentage of products answering
national requirements, customers’ satisfaction with
fusion center products, numbers of products produced,
and the perception of supported agencies [3]. The
difficulty with having a report card tied to arbitrary
production metrics rather than results is that the focus
inevitably shifts to meet expected numbers instead of
meeting expected results. An example consequence of
national grading requirements is that only 10% of the
fusion center distributable products created in 2016
addressed state/local customer information needs [4].
The goal of any endeavor in intelligence is to
increase the understanding of a particular problem set
within a target audience. Whether the target audience
consists of decision makers, action takers, or those who
are only tangentially affected, the reason for conducting
the function of intelligence is to apply analysis to
information in order to answer the question, “so what”
[5]. Quite often that function is much easier said than
done due to both the subjectivity and complexity
involved with interpreting partial and incomplete data to
draw meaningful conclusions. As with many complex
processes, the function of intelligence is at the same
time highly structured and very fluid. Governed by
recognized standards at the national level, organizations
that belong to and adhere to these Intelligence
Community Directives (ICDs) establish strict
procedures to review and handle quality control for any
analytical products they create [6]. Likewise, these
standards guide every part of the analytical process.
The member organizations of the Intelligence
Community (IC) each operate under specific charters,
whose actions and foci are made distinct by varying
authorities within the mission of the organization.
Because many aspects of those specific missions have a
domestic aspect, even more complexity is introduced as
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protections are enacted to preserve the privacy and
respect the First Amendment Rights of U.S. Persons [2].
Additionally, the domestic realm is where the national
security responsibilities of federal agencies most often
intersect and have the potential to overlap with state and
local law enforcement organizations.
It is out of this delicate environment that fusion
centers developed. Fusion centers are defined as a
collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide
resources, expertise, and/or information to the center
with a goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent,
apprehend, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity
[7]. Predictably, with so many converging interests to
serve, fusion centers have come under regular critical
review. Privacy organizations have criticized the role of
domestic
intelligence
centers,
government
accountability watchdogs and congressional reviews
have targeted the viability and return-on-investment
from fusion centers, and many practitioners of law
enforcement and intelligence within the homeland
security arena have questioned the efficacy and
efficiency of fusion centers as information sharing hubs
[8]. The centers have their defenders, as well, and while
much of what is written on fusion centers in professional
and peer-reviewed journals could be interpreted as
critical of at least one function they perform, there is
also a consensus that the requirement they were created
to fill is a crucial one [9].
This paper addresses the research questions of what
are the historical barriers to information sharing, and
how can fusion centers become more efficient and
effective in this role? These questions are researched
using a case study research on a Structured Analytic
Technique exercise to observe information sharing
barriers and proposes that applying the concepts of the
modified knowledge pyramid (figure 1) [10] would help
fusion centers create a strategy to produce actionable
intelligence and thus improve the effectiveness of the
fusion center.

2. Background
As previously stated, state and local fusion centers
were created from the feedback and insight of the 9/11
Commission Report, and the demonstrable need for
formalized information sharing between federal, state
and local entities. This proved difficult to accomplish
in execution. Congressional studies, Department of
Homeland Security annual reports, and academic work
from security and intelligence professionals were all
very blunt in identifying their weaknesses. Multiple
attempts were made to establish fusion center guidelines
and delineate a set of baseline capabilities, while
acknowledging that fusion centers at the state and local
level were prone to develop in ways that seemed to fit a
regional niche [11]. A recurring theme in critiques is
that while fusion centers were quick to adapt in ways
that would add value, primarily at the local and regional
level, the activities they undertook were not what would
traditionally be defined as the “true fusion” of all
sources of intelligence [8].
The Department of Defense definition of fusion is
a multilevel, multifaceted process dealing with the
automatic
detection,
association,
correlation,
estimation, and combination of data and information
from single or multiple sources [12]. The Department
of Justice, in establishing the guidelines for state and
local fusion centers, characterized the fusion process by
its ability to combine possibly uncertain, incomplete,
and contradictory data, perhaps resulting in data or
information of improved quality [12]. Together, these
concepts form the key function which state and local
centers were created to perform, with the process
illustrated by the diagram below, which amplifies the
intelligence cycle.
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Figure 1, Jennex Revised Knowledge Pyramid [10]
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Figure 2. The Fusion Process Overview [13]
Figure 2 demonstrates the perpetual activities
undertaken by fusion centers, and places them into their
proper order. Each step of this process can be done by
organizations which contribute to fusion center efforts
at their own facilities. The strength which fusion centers
bring is the ability to conduct all these steps within the
same physical location, decreasing the time the cycle
takes to complete and thereby increasing the capacity to
execute multiple cycles.
The most effective fusion centers are collocated
with agencies or task forces fulfilling other existing
functions, such as High-Intensity Drug Trafficking
Areas or Joint Terrorism Task Forces. Layering fusion
centers with existing multi-agency organizations was
meant to leverage existing relationships to further
improve information sharing. This led to fusion centers
expanding from the initial roles of counterterrorism
analysis into a more all-crime/all-hazards approach.
Fusion centers added mission sets to fill observed gaps
within their regions, supporting investigations, deconflicting local law enforcement operations, or
supporting special events, all of which have
exponentially increased the amount of information that
they consume. One thing all these functions require,
however, is effective use of this information. This is
where the concepts of knowledge and information
management come into play, which facilitate the
following analysis to produce intelligence. With as
much data and raw information as is available, a method
to triage, identify information of value, and disseminate
that information is vital.
Fusion centers support the drive for evidence based
decision making. Figure 1, the revised Knowledge

Pyramid shows technologies that gather and analyze
observations of reality faster than and in amounts
greater than what humans can process as the filters that
support the creation of actionable intelligence [10]. This
model provides value by showing relationships between
technologies and decision support artifacts (Internet of
things, big data, data, information, knowledge,
intelligence) and by providing a model that assists in
creating a strategy for selecting and managing
technologies to create actionable intelligence for
immediate decision making.
The model assists fusion center managers in
planning and creating a knowledge management (KM)
strategy to guide fusion center activities. A KM strategy
is a statement of how knowledge will be captured and
used. Fusion centers need to have a KM strategy for
managing the layers of knowing and technologies in the
revised knowledge pyramid. Jennex [14] [15] found
having a KM strategy improved performance through
better decision making; and identified the components
needed in this strategy. The basic components of a KM
strategy can be generalized and made useful for
managing knowledge pyramid activities including:
• Identification of users of the knowledge pyramid
layers and transformation processes
• Identification of actionable intelligence needed to
support decision making
• Identification of sources of big data, data,
information, and knowledge
• Identification of big data, data, information, and
knowledge to be captured
• Identification of how captured big data, data,
information, and knowledge is to be stored and
represented
• Identification of technologies to be used to support
capturing and processing big data, data,
information, and knowledge
• Generation of top management support
• Establishment of metrics for big data, data,
information, and knowledge use
• Establishment of feedback and adjustment process
on the effectiveness of actionable intelligence use
The goal is to add a top down strategy approach based
on the decisions to be made and identifying the
technologies and decision support components needed,
to the bottom up data discovery process currently used.
Additionally, the more focused the strategy the stronger
the filters that are created blocking big data, data,
information, and knowledge not needed to support
decision making.

3. Methodology
In preparing this paper, the authors utilized official
reviews and Congressional Research Study reports
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discussing the challenges facing fusion centers as they
have matured in the years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The key arguments detailing inefficiencies and
perceived weaknesses were then viewed and analyzed
from a KM lens, with the resulting observations leading
to a recommendation for improving the effectiveness on
how the massive amounts of data are processed,
disseminated, and used. This paper also uses a
Structured Analytic Technique exercise as described by
Heuer and Pherson [16] as a case of a method that fusion
centers could regularly implement to specifically
address the challenges of knowledge sharing.
The Structured Analytic Technic case is presented
to demonstrate and discuss how the analysts approached
the data in this setting and utilized a flexible set of
structured analytic options to transform that data into
information, capture it as knowledge, and press it
forward as actionable intelligence in line with the KM
pyramid in figure 1. The participants in this case were
members of regional security committee within the San
Diego public sector representing federal, state, and local
law enforcement agencies. The SAT exercise was held
in San Diego in the summer of 2018. The SAT analytic
scenario was to assess the likelihood of three distinctive
threat vectors occurring within the region. Reporting
that originated from both local and federal law
enforcement organizations was reviewed, analyzed, and
interpreted by the participating analysts. During this
single day event, the analysis led the participants to
identify gaps, create intelligence and information
requirements,
and
conduct
analyst-to-analyst
coordination among adjacent organizations with
sympathetic interests in the security of their region.
These efforts simultaneously completed several steps of
the intelligence cycle, depicted in the diagram below.

Figure 3. The Intelligence Cycle [17]
The approximately 20 participating members
represented six organizations from the local government
level to federal law enforcement agencies. Eight of the
participants were also representatives from their
organizations to the security committee, while the

remaining analysts were brought in from the member
organizations to provide additional experience and
different perspectives.
Participants were split into three similarly sized
teams, each focused on one aspect of the scenario.
Analysis material comprised of threat reporting and
crime data provided by the participating member
organizations from the prior two years.
The first team conducted structured brainstorming
to generate a range of hypotheses [16] and quickly
surmised that there were significant gaps in the available
reporting that hindered the ability to create relevant and
specific hypotheses based on the evidence. However,
the divergent thinking process led to the identification
of a series of conditions that existed which lacked any
of the type of reporting seen. The techniques of creating
a list of descriptive indicators [16] was then used to
create a specific and descriptive list of expected
indicators for a number of distinct scenarios which were
translated into and captured as intelligence
requirements. By identifying the conditions that
enabled the activities noted in the relevant reporting, the
team was able to extrapolate additional scenarios and
create a series of observable indicators to prove or
disprove hypotheses.
The second team conducted a thorough analysis of
competing hypotheses against their problem set, a useful
tool to combat the phenomenon of satisficing, or going
with the first answer that seems to be supported by the
evidence [16]. Analysis of competing hypotheses
requires analysts to identify and then try to refute as
many reasonable hypotheses as possible using the full
range of data, assumptions, and gaps that are pertinent
to the problem at hand [16]. By trying to disprove an
analytical hypothesis, it forces the participants to go
against their own assumptions and look beyond any
potential cognitive biases by looking specifically for
reporting or indicators which support a single, mutually
exclusive theory while discounting those which support
multiple, mutually-exclusive theories.
The third team used a quadrant hypothesis
generation model to prioritize responses to scenarios
stemming from two primary drivers. This tool is used
when the situation is affected by relatively few driving
forces, and identifies four potential scenarios that
represent the extreme conditions for each of the two
major drivers [16]. This enabled them to extrapolate the
unique indicators which would point to one of the four
potentialities.

4. Findings
While the initial goal of the session was not fully
met (an assessment of the likelihood of several threat
vectors occurring in the region), there were a number of
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valuable take-a-ways and results. On the strategic level
for the region multiple gaps in the collective knowledge
were specifically identified and captured, along with the
creation of observable indicators that would answer
those gaps. At the organizational level, analysts from
the participating agencies had the opportunity to expand
their perspective on issues they work on as a daily part
of their jobs, as well as creating ‘boundary-spanning’
relationships with their peers in adjacent agencies.
Individually, each analyst expanded their knowledge of
both the capabilities and limitations of each
participating agency, improved their understanding of
their own problem set, and brought back to their agency
both the procedural knowledge to recreate this process
on additional topics and the specific knowledge of the
problem we analyzed as a group.
The execution of the SAT effort accomplished
more than just a transfer of knowledge across
participating agencies. The benefits were threefold:
data was presented that had not previously been viewed
by all parties; capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of
participating agencies were shared and discussed
amongst the group; and relationships were fostered to
further the sharing of both information and knowledge
on an analyst-to-analyst level into the future. A
previous key critique [2] was that little ‘true fusion, or
analysis of disparate data sources, identification of
intelligence gaps, and pro-active collection of
intelligence against those gaps which could contribute
to prevention is occurring. The analytic exchange which
occurred in the course of a single day accomplished all
of these tasks on a regional level. New data was shared
among all members, formal analytical processes were
executed to fuse the data into information, and then the
information into intelligence, and the resulting
intelligence was further examined to identify gaps in
knowledge and craft requirements to drive future
collections and operations.
Leveraging boundary-spanning analysts with
overlapping interests, the intelligence produced by the
group was of far greater value than the sum of its parts.
Those participating analysts returned to their agencies at
the end of the day with actionable information that could
be injected into the specific collection management
operations of their own organizations. Additionally,
they could then brief their leadership on the
complementary and supporting activities of their partner
agencies to produce a greater situational awareness of
friendly efforts along similar lines of effort.
The analysis was recorded in an after-action report
(AAR) that captured the step-by-step process each team
took to approach the problem they faced. The AAR
recorded the specific inputs and ideas generated by each
group, to include hypotheses and theories, allowing
supervisors or analysts looking at the same issues to

retrace the steps of the exercise. The intelligence
portion of the effort was captured in a brief for the
regional security committee’s executive steering group.
The brief highlighted to the committee’s leadership key
concerns and information gaps identified by the
analysis, as well as recommended strategies for
educational outreach to improve the amount of relevant
threat reporting coming in. At the brief, the lead
analysts were able to present additional efforts
undertaken by participating agencies which were
spurred by the analytical effort, demonstrating the value
of ‘actionable analysis.’ In one case, a specific gap
identified by the collaborating analysts initiated an
operation within a participating law enforcement
organization that resulted in the arrests of individuals
who had been attempting to exploit the very
vulnerabilities the group highlighted.
With the resulting intelligence taken for action by
participating agencies immediately after its generation,
there was no time lost between the conduct of the
analysis and waiting for a formal product to be
published. The formal, structured process of this
method captures every input, as well as the thought
process and interpretation of data used to form the
analytic line, easily allowing supervisors or objective
observers to audit and review the results. This ease of
auditing acts as quick balance to the lengthy review
process conducted for written analytical products.
Focusing on the immediate applicability of the ingested
information speeds up the intelligence cycle functions
by combining processing and exploitation with analysis
and production, so that the resulting dissemination and
integration can directly be utilized to spur action (See
figure 3). Those actions then produce new inputs that
drive evaluation and feedback to let the analysts know
whether their work has been useful and help to answer
gaps that were previously identified.
This process is the same that occurs in any
organization doing work in the intelligence field,
however, it was focused and streamlined within the
fertile microcosm of a collaborative and structured
analytical setting. Absent only the functions of planning
and direction and collection, the SAT session facilitates
the timely translation of data first into information and
then directly into intelligence [18]. These concepts will
further be explained in the next segment, as the
successful and replicable processes demonstrated by
executing collaborative SATs are further unpacked in
the light of KM.

5. Discussion
Fusion Centers conduct or contribute to a statewide
and/or regional risk assessment that identifies and
prioritizes threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences at
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regular intervals [19]. These regular assessments take
several forms, and also offer ideal opportunities for
cross-organization coordination and collaboration. This
paper presented a case where a SAT process was used
by a multi-agency organization to improve knowledge
sharing and increase effectiveness of actionable
intelligence generation. It is anticipated that other fusion
centers can leverage their combined analytic strength
through focused SATs to craft timely, sound, and
relevant intelligence. The result would be ideal for both
independent agency operations and shared situational
awareness.
SAT addresses several of the core
knowledge sharing and intelligence generation issues in
KM to improve organizational effectiveness and
decision making [20]. Among these are the knowledge
sharing barriers of lack of trust and fear of loss of control
over generated knowledge [21]. SAT addressed these
issues by getting teams together in a manner that
generated team trust and got them to produce
recommendations that allowed all team members to
claim ownership.
Fusion center effectiveness is measured using
metrics such as production numbers and product types
[3]. Many studies at the Congressional level have
identified that most of the reporting being completed is
redundant or overcome by events by the time it has been
released [2]. Additionally, because the funding is
decided locally while the rating occurs federally, there
is a disconnect between what fusion centers do on a
daily basis and what they are graded for [13]. KM
provides an excellent framework and lens through
which to view the functions of fusion centers, and a
more practical model for realizing the true value and
return on investment which fusion centers can offer. By
exploring key concepts such as the sharing of
information, transforming it into knowledge, and
capturing it as actionable intelligence at the
organizational level, the benefit of efforts such as SAT
become clear. When SAT is viewed in light of figure 1,
the value of each step is apparent and demonstrates
progress toward improved organizational effectiveness.
The SAT case in this paper is presented as a
mechanism for improved sharing of actionable
intelligence at the local and regional level. Previous
discussion above has laid out the critiques against fusion
centers, offering reasons why the deceptively simple
concept of information sharing is so difficult to execute.
Fortunately, a great deal of research has been conducted
into the academic concepts which make this process
work and work effectively. KM researchers have
identified three distinctive perspectives for individuals
sharing information for the public good: they share
knowledge without the need for reciprocity
(cooperators), they feel obligated to share their
knowledge (reciprocators), or they take knowledge for

granted (free riders) [22]. The fusion center plays the
role of the cooperator in sharing as much information as
possible and facilitating the collaboration amongst all
participants, who are reciprocators. Additionally, KM
explains why SAT improves knowledge sharing by
looking at the concepts of affective organizational
commitment reciprocity, and enhanced reputation.
Affective organizational commitment is improved when
members get a feeling of belongingness with the
organization. Fusion centers are multi-organizational
resulting in lower feelings of belongingness. SAT
increases belongingness by having the fusion center
members work together in multi-organizational teams
[23]. Reciprocity increases knowledge sharing as
members are more likely to share when they feel other
members will also share. Reciprocity is improved when
the employees build relationships, SAT, does this
through its team approach [24]. Enhanced reputation
increases knowledge sharing as the sharer perceives it
as a reward for sharing. SAT, through its team approach,
allows its members to generate reputation through their
participation in sharing [24]. Finally, organizational
effectiveness has been shown to be improved when
knowledge sharing is improved [25] so a SAT improves
fusion center effectiveness by improving knowledge
sharing.
Additionally,
KM
views
the
analytical
collaboration created by fusion centers is as de facto
communities of practice (CoP). CoPs are groups of
people informally bound together by a shared practice
and passion for a joint enterprise [26]. CoPs are a social
construct, characterized as a social group that shares
common objectives but which is not necessarily
structured as an organizational unit [26].
Both
definitions fit the purpose of the type of collaboration
that fusion centers were created to facilitate, as well as
the cooperation to which SATs lend themselves.
When viewed as regional CoPs, fusion centers are
ideally placed to fill the critical role of an organization
champion within the collective group, where
organizational champions (cooperators) bring sufficient
knowledge and foster a rich intellectual environment are
one of the key success factors of CoPs [21]. The
challenge in enabling the fusion center to fill the role it
was designed for is establishing the correct context to
gather and form a CoP, as at any given time a fusion
center could realistically be dedicating resources and
analysts toward counterterrorism issues, criminal issues,
and all-hazards issues simultaneously. Each focus could
generate its own CoP, with that CoP providing a
collective knowledge base that varying members can
access freely and to which they can contribute with or
without expecting benefits [21].
To keep the CoP viable and engaged requires more
than just bringing like-minded and experienced law
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enforcement organizations and analysts together. KM
researchers have revealed correlations that the fraction
of cooperators is positively related to the total
knowledge contribution and to the reciprocity level,
while the reciprocity level positively affects knowledge
contribution [21].
This reflects the ability of
cooperators to influence the overall sharing of
information and increase the total amount of
information shared by participants in a CoP. If
participants do not see value in sharing or are not
influenced to contribute some effort to the group, the
overall effectiveness of a CoP goes down in generating
collective knowledge or intelligence. This is the beauty
of collaborative SAT efforts: a single cooperator can
generate the raw data and information which
participating reciprocators and even free riders can
analyze in a cooperative setting to generate new
knowledge to the benefit of all.
A single successful session can generate
demonstrable results, and the credit can be shared
among all participants. The additional benefit to
holding such sessions is that knowledge sharing
research suggests individuals are more likely to share
expertise inter-organizationally via face-to-face, than
through other indirect or impersonal methods [21].
Direct and interpersonal settings serve to break down
many of the organizational and systemic barriers to
information sharing and can facilitate greater
information sharing via the systems that are required to
conduct any mission worked by fusion centers.
The meticulously structured nature of SATs allows
future repetitions of such efforts that look at evolving
threats and build upon the efforts of the analysts who
have conducted these processes before them.
Identifying any initially held cognitive biases, and the
circumstances which led to any assumptions made by
previous analysts gives future iterations a foundation
upon which to build their efforts. It also creates a body
of notes for posterity that can provide future analysts
with thought-provoking hypotheses or theories that had
been discounted but could prove viable in light of new
and emerging information. In this sense, the process
blends even more into the definition of a knowledge
management success, “reusing knowledge to improve
organizational effectiveness by providing the
appropriate knowledge to those that need it when it is
needed [17].
The Revised Knowledge-Knowledge Management
Pyramid (figure 1) depicts how raw inputs are examined
in light of previous experience and learning, revised
with research and analysis, and combined to become
knowledge and organizational learning. This provides
the ideal context for describing the value of
collaborative SAT efforts, while the former depicts
quite simply the goals of the intelligence cycle.

In the context of a SAT effort, the social network
on the periphery of the figure 1 is indicative of the
participating analysts, and their unique perspectives and
experiences.
As the observations of reality are
interpreted by the sensors (collection) which report the
raw data, the application of the intelligence cycle
transforms the inputs from data to information, and
eventually to actionable intelligence. As the process
occurs, in addition to the arrows approaching
organizational learning in the center, individual learning
is depicted by the arrows radiating outward. Thus, as
the knowledge is created that benefits the group, so too
is knowledge that benefits each participating analyst,
growing both the whole and the sum of its parts
simultaneously.
Figure 1 includes additional levels of filters and
sensors representing the recognition that technology has
enabled the collection, aggregation, and filtering of data
at a staggering level. The Internet of Things (IoT), the
ability to ingest unstructured data from multiple
unrelated databases, and machine learning applications
have driven the concept of big data with the goals of
identifying intelligence for evidence based decision
making, transforming intuitive based decision making
to evidence based decision making, and pushing
decision making to lower levels of the organization [27].
Figure 1 demonstrates the potential that could be
reached by a more unified and organized approach to
engaging in SAT efforts, and hints at the results that
could be achieved. As the event was conducted using
limited inputs from the participating organizations, it is
a testimony to the process that successful results were
returned.
With the resulting efforts captured both in
intelligence products and AARs, analysts can review the
outputs as well as how the inputs were treated to reach
their analytical conclusions. As organizational learning
is the consequence of this process, knowledge and
wisdom are captured at the analytical hub of the activity.
With the fusion centers serving as the apex of this
process, the wisdom generated through communal
analysis is available for all participating agencies.
The value generated by the structured sharing of
information in this manner plays to the strengths which
numerous studies identified in fusion centers, to include
the formal and informal boundary-spanning connections
at the analyst level. It counters many of the weaknesses
including lengthy deliberate production timelines and
barriers to information sharing. The additional benefit
of the process is that it is simple and repeatable, with no
specialized knowledge required above basic analyst
training. These concepts are introduced at the novice
level, but far too few analysts ever execute them in their
positions. By increasing the use of these SAT efforts on
a national level across the National Network of Fusion
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Centers, many more regional issues could be engaged
and more available data could be transformed into
actionable analysis.
Additionally, fusion centers have expanded their
focus capacity. While this was initially met with
friction, and was cast in a negative light by official
Congressional and Department of Homeland Security
reviews, this shift demonstrated an organic settling of
fusion centers into a needed role to provide a regional
context for both criminal and all-hazards threat
information. The Department of Homeland Security
Inspector General Report [28] that arrived at the same
conclusion, that up until that point, some intelligence
products could better meet state and local needs. These
observations drove a natural migration where fusion
centers shifted their focus to better fill local and regional
requirements, particularly as state and local
governments began to pay an increasing portion of
fusion center operating costs.
Between these efforts and others, fusion centers
began to mature around 2010, demonstrating many
successes both in contributing to the disruption of
terrorist plots at the local and regional level, as well as
providing valuable all-crimes, all-hazards threat support
to state and local law enforcement jurisdictions.
However, many challenges to reaching the initial
information sharing goals remain. Chief among them
are the difficulty of conducting true intelligence fusion
processes and disseminating jointly authored analytical
products in a timely manner. As critique after critique
identified, too often fusion centers and the federal
agency representatives detailed to them failed to
produce analytical products that kept up with the speed
of relevance.
One aspect of that issue missing from this paper is
the study of the information systems (IS) utilized by
these agencies to facilitate knowledge sharing and
collaborative analysis to produce intelligence. The
primary existing networks have been identified as the
Homeland Secure Data Network for classified
information sharing, and the Homeland Security
Information Network for controlled but unclassified
information sharing between federal, state, and local
partners. Discussion of these IS and their contributions
to or detractions from the issue of information sharing
and collaborative analysis have been avoided
deliberately to focus on the human factors which fusion
centers can largely control or influence. However, these
systems do have an impact on KM and knowledge
sharing as is shown by Figure 4 where the impact of
technical resources influences the success of KM.
The re-specified Jennex-Olfman KM Success
Model, figure 4, identifies three primary driving factors
for successful KM efforts. Those drivers are system
quality, or the technological resources and human

infrastructure devoted to the effort; knowledge quality,
the usefulness and accuracy of the content and its ability
to help users in performing their duties; and service
quality, the support of the effort demonstrated by
leadership/management support [27].

Figure 4, Re-specified Jennex Olfman KM Success
Model [25]
This model offers fusion centers insight that
supports that improving fusion center effectiveness also
needs IS sufficient to support effective knowledge
sharing and applies directly to conducting successful
SAT events. Another takeaway from figure 4 is the
equal importance of leadership buy-in to the process,
demonstrated by having direction from the top of the
organization that appropriates the resources needed for
KM as well as creates and maintains the knowledge
sharing, knowledge using culture necessary for KM to
succeed [27]. Placing this concept on equal footing with
both the quality of the processed knowledge and quality
of the systems and analysts conducting the efforts
reflects the importance that organizational culture has
on achieving successful information sharing results.
Finally, further research has found that while figure
4 shows the precursors to KM success, they also form
measures of KM success. With leadership support,
knowledge quality can likewise be improved to feed the
process. By increasing the amount and quality of data
available to be analyzed through incorporating the
myriad open-source sensors and resources available to
fusion center partners, and utilizing technological filters
including artificial intelligence algorithms to parse the
data into digestible packets, SAT efforts could receive a
significant head-start in the process of producing
actionable intelligence. Finally, leadership support can
ensure technology resources are available for a trained
and eager cadre of analysts to fully utilize in their
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collaborative efforts and set the mission up for success,
where recognition of KM success is getting the right
knowledge to the right people at the right time [28]. A
further suggestion is that this research can be used to
create additional metrics for measuring fusion center
success focused on leadership, content, and center focus
to be used in addition to the previously discussed
process measure.

local and regional relationships between analysts,
bringing like-minded professionals together to look at
shared problems, and creating the types of opportunities
where boundary-spanning activities can occur. In short,
it is that effort to use many of the things that are best in
fusion centers to counter some of those issues which
outsiders view as wrong with fusion centers.
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